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RESPONSE 
 
Response to Colin Koopman’s “Historical Critique or Transcendental Critique 
in Foucault: Two Kantian Lineages” 
Kevin Thompson, DePaul University 
 
In ‚Historical Critique or Transcendental Critique in Foucault: Two Kantian 
Lineages‛ *hereafter, HCTC+, Colin Koopman offers an important contribution to the 
on-going discussion of Foucault’s historical methodology.  His account takes its 
point of departure from a strident critique of recent efforts that have, in varying 
ways, sought to establish that Foucault’s work is rooted in the transcendental 
phenomenological tradition.  Koopman argues that this interpretative strategy fails 
on textual as well as conceptual grounds.  Moreover, consideration of these issues, 
Koopman contends, compels a reading of Foucault’s turn to genealogy and proble-
matization as the development of a unique form of non-transcendental (yet still 
Kantian) critique, what Koopman calls ‚pragmatic genealogy.‛  
 One of the versions of the phenomenological interpretation of Foucault 
against which Koopman argues is one that I have proposed and sought to defend.1  
In what follows, I offer a response to Koopman’s critique.  In particular, I seek to 
show that it is flawed in two ways: (1) the main thrust of the proposed criticism is 
textually misguided, and (2) the conceptual issue, which leads to Koopman’s alter-
native account of Foucault’s method, is rendered more, rather than less, problematic 
precisely by his rejection of the phenomenological reading.  
 
I. Transcendental Narcissism 
Koopman surveys some of the relevant evidence that we have of Foucault’s own 
situating of his project with respect to the phenomenological tradition and finds that, 
as he puts it, ‚*t+o the extent that Foucault saw his own work in this lineage, it may 
have been on the basis of its refusal of the transcendental.‛ (HCTC, 8)  Moreover, 
Koopman suggests, Foucault’s stated desideratum, in the famous conclusion of L’Ar-
chéologie du savoir [1969], to cleanse historical methodology of any taint of what he 
                                                 
1 Kevin Thompson, ‚Historicity and Transcendentality: Foucault, Cavaillès, and the Phenomeno-
logy of the Concept,‛ History and Theory 47 (2008): 1-18.  
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called ‚transcendental narcissism‛ amounts to an ‚unequivocal‛ rejection of any 
form of transcendental phenomenological inquiry. (HCTC, 9-10)   
 Koopman’s reading of this material is, I believe, misguided.  Foucault says, 
when setting himself within the lineage that begins with Cavaillès, that Husserlian 
phenomenology itself became in France the ‚contested object of two possible 
readings.‛2  One reading, that pursued by Sartre and Merleau-Ponty, Foucault tells 
us, sought to radicalize this methodology in the direction of subjectivity, while the 
other, that of Cavaillès, Bachelard, Koyré, and Canguilhem, tried to return it to its 
own founding problematics: formalism and intuitionism.  
 The former trajectory here is, recognizably, a distinct strand within the 
broader phenomenological tradition: constitutive phenomenology.  The hallmark of 
this method, which Husserl introduced with the act-oriented transcendental idea-
lism of Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie I [1913] 
and which can be seen at work in the early writings of both Sartre and Merleau-
Ponty, is that it seeks to trace all various kinds of objectivities (theoretical, practical, 
or axiological), as intentional objects, back to their origin in the performances of 
constituting subjectivity.  This is the project of what Husserl eventually came to call 
regressive inquiry or questioning back (Rückfrage).  
 I contend that it is this form of phenomenological methodology that Foucault 
has as his target in the feigned dialogue with which he concludes L’Archéologie du 
savoir. When he writes there that, for him, the essential task was ‚to free the history 
of thought from its transcendental subjection,‛3 he is referring precisely to the 
method of tracing historical events and achievements back to their origins in the 
performances of constitutive subjectivity, whether this be of individuals or of com-
munities.  It is a view of history—premised on a definite teleology and temporality—
that enables subjectivity, confidently and irresistibly, to see its founding acts, to see 
itself even, everywhere in the positivities of tradition.  This is what Foucault calls 
‚transcendental narcissism‛4 and it is this method that must, he says, be purged 
from the history of thought in order to allow it its true discontinuity, dispersion, 
anonymity, and non-linear temporality.  Archaeology is not a search for the origin; it 
does not excavate the sediment of founding acts and thereby seek to restore and 
preserve the entitlements of ‚constituent consciousness.‛5  Its aim, rather, is precise-
ly ‚to liberate history from the grip of phenomenology.‛6 
                                                 
2  Michel Foucault, Dits et écrits. 1954-1988, vol. 3 (Paris: Gallimard, 1994), 430 ; Michel Foucault, 
Dits et écrits. 1954-1988, vol. 4 (Paris: Gallimard, 1994), 764.   
3 Michel Foucault, L’Archéologie du savoir (Paris: Gallimard, 1969), 264 [Michel Foucault, The 
Archaeology of Knowledge (and the Discourse on Language) (New York: Harper, 1972), 203] 
[translation modified]. 
4 Ibid., 265 [203]. 
5 Ibid. 
6 Ibid. 
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 Koopman does not cite this last line, but it would clearly be read by him as 
one more ‚unequivocal‛ caution against the transcendental, the final nail in the 
coffin, so to speak, for the verdict that archaeological method fundamentally rejects 
all forms of phenomenological inquiry.  But if the context that I have sought briefly 
to reconstruct above, and developed more in my essay, is correct, then Foucault’s 
treatment of phenomenology in these passages, as well as in the earlier Les Mots et les 
Choses [1966] and elsewhere during this period, applies solely to a specific form of 
phenomenological method, the only kind guilty of transcendental narcissism: consti-
tutive phenomenology.  
 But this simply confirms what Foucault says later, that his own research 
belongs in a different lineage than that of a philosophy of the subject.  It does not 
affect his claim that his work operates within the heritage of another reading of the 
‚contested object‛ that is phenomenology: that worked out and practiced by Ca-
vaillès and the tradition of the phenomenology of scientific rationality that emerged 
from his research, what I have proposed to call a ‚phenomenology of the concept.‛  
 Foucault’s remarks clearly show, I believe, that he saw Cavaillès as offering 
another appropriation of phenomenology, another possible reading, one that, to be 
sure, differed precisely with constitutive phenomenology on the question of the fun-
damentality of constituting subjectivity, but that, despite this, nonetheless remained 
phenomenological.  In doing this, Cavaillès was actually, in some ways, turning phe-
nomenology, once again, as Foucault himself notes, back to its roots in eidetic 
description freed from the demands of a transcendental ground in consciousness.  
What Cavaillès discovered or, we might better say, rediscovered was thus the path 
of realistic phenomenology, the object-oriented form of eidetic description that 
Husserl himself practiced in Göttingen, a form of phenomenology that found 
expression in his Logische Untersuchungen [1900-1901].  Hence, when Foucault set his 
own work within this tradition and refers to this vein as returning phenomenology 
to its roots, this is best read, I contend, as showing that he was consciously em-
bracing the promise of phenomenology that Cavaillès had opened up and that he 
saw his own unique form of historical inquiry as critically furthering precisely this 
lineage.  
 But if this is correct, then the critique of ‚transcendental narcissism‛ that 
Koopman offers of the phenomenological interpretation that I have proposed is 
simply off target.  Eidetic description need not trace the structures it discerns back to 
an origin in constituting consciousness.  Through imaginative variation, it can open 
up a transcendental field that is not governed by the sovereignty of subjectivity, a 
domain that Jean Hyppolite once called a ‚subjectless transcendental field‛ and the 
early Sartre termed a ‚pre-subjective transcendental field.‛  Transcendental narcis-
sism is thus properly seen, at least at its core, then, as a version of the same basic 
critique that realistic phenomenology has continually offered against its constitutive 
cousin.  
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II. Problematization 
Koopman’s critique, however, ultimately appeals to what are surely much more 
fundamental issues, namely, the ‚philosophical shortcomings‛ or ‚defects‛ that, he 
contends, Foucault came to recognize in the archaeological method and that moti-
vated his ‚expansion‛ of it into genealogy. (cf., HCTC, 13)  On Koopman’s recon-
struction, archaeology isolates conditions immanent to a single vector of practice, 
while genealogy enables such conditions to be traced along the intersection of multi-
ple vectors, a complexity that Koopman believes Foucault sought to capture with the 
term ‚problematization.‛ (cf., HCTC, 11-16)  Koopman infers from this account that 
it was the inability of the archaeological method to grasp this kind of complexity that 
led Foucault to reject those features of this mode of inquiry that made it appear to be 
a form of transcendental investigation: ‚Foucault may have stumbled his way for a 
time into something resembling historical-transcendental inquiry, but once he 
recognized that he was there he headed elsewhere almost immediately, indeed even 
before The Archaeology of Knowledge was finished.‛ (HCTC, 15)  
 Koopman argues that the method that came to replace the transcendental 
delusions of the archaeological period was a form of genealogical inquiry that 
nonetheless remained critical in the Kantian sense in that it sought after what 
Koopman calls ‚limiting conditions of possibility,‛ (HCTC, 19) rather than the 
transcendental conditions of discursive formations with which Foucault had earlier 
uneasily flirted.  The shift to genealogy, in Koopman’s view, is thus not only a move 
to a more complex object of investigation, but also a move decisively and irrevocably 
away from the framework of transcendental method.  
 However, in my judgment, the central tenets of this reconstruction fail both 
textually and philosophically.  To see this, we can turn to the concept at the center of 
Koopman’s account: problematization.  In his fullest treatment of this methodologi-
cal innovation in the Introduction to L’Usage des plaisirs [1984], Foucault writes that 
the central task of a ‚history of thought,‛ as he now calls his project, which, in the 
end, would be a ‚history of truth,‛ is ‚to define the conditions in which human 
beings ‘problematize’ what they are, what they do, and the world in which they 
live.‛7  
 We should note two things about this passage: (1) problematizations are said 
here to be the objects of the distinctive kind of historical inquiry that Foucault takes 
himself to be practicing, and (2) a history of thought is fundamentally concerned not 
with problematizations, but with the conditions from which they emerge and in 
which they operate.  Let us briefly consider each of these points in turn. 
                                                 
7 Michel Foucault, Histoire de la sexualité, Tome II: L’Usage des plaisirs (Paris: Gallimard, 1984), 16 
[Michel Foucault, The Use of Pleasure: The History of Sexuality: Volume Two (New York: Vintage, 
1986), 10]; cf. Foucault, Dits et écrits. 1954-1988, vol. 4, 544. 
Foucault Studies, No. 8, pp. 122-128.  
126 
 
 Foucault carefully delineates the domain carved out by problematizations, as 
he had statements (énoncés) in L’Archéologie du savoir, from that of behaviors, ideas, 
societies, or ideologies.  Problematizations, he writes, are that ‚through which being 
gives itself as able and as necessarily to be thought.‛8  Problematizations thus denote 
the historically specific ways in which something—whether it be an object, a 
behavior, an experience, even the world itself—becomes a matter of concern, an 
issue to be interrogated and reflected upon, and the way in which something stands 
as material for subsequent work.9  
 Foucault holds that each kind of historical problematization is forged on the 
basis of equally distinct historical practices.  The historical analytic that Foucault 
now proposes thus seeks to examine matrices comprised of problematizations and 
the techniques out of which they are formed.  Accordingly, he lays out the relation 
between the archaeological and the genealogical in terms of this dual focus: ‚The 
archaeological dimension of the analysis made it possible to examine the forms of 
problematization themselves; its genealogical dimension enabled me to analyze their 
formation out of the practices and their modifications.‛10 But this means that the 
relationship between the archaeological and the genealogical is not, as Koopman 
would have it, a matter of complexity.  Rather, archaeology and genealogy are sim-
ply different dimensions of a single method that pursues distinct objects of inves-
tigation and poses equally distinct fundamental questions.  
 It would thus seem better to say that what Foucault achieved with the 
introduction of genealogy was an intensification of the kind of exploration of prac-
tices that he had already begun in archaeology.  But does this intensification lead to 
a rejection of the transcendental framework of the early period as Koopman con-
tends? 
 To address this question we come to the second point, the conditions of 
problematizations.  Foucault holds that the task of archaeology, even in what would 
turn out to be this last phase of his work, is to discern the ‚forms‛ of problema-
tization.  From the examples he gives, based upon a rereading of his own corpus, 
this means setting out the historically specific structures in and through which 
various kinds of matters have been put at issue: in the case of the problematizations 
of madness and illness, ‚a certain pattern of normalization‛, for those of life, lan-
guage, and labor, ‚certain ‘epistemic rules’‛, and for the prolematizations of crime 
and criminal behavior, ‚a ‘disciplinary’ model.‛11 
 Earlier in the same text Foucault refers to these historical structures as 
‚games of truth,‛ which he defines as ‚the games of truth and error through which 
                                                 
8 Ibid., 17 [11] [translation modified]; cf., 545. 
9 Ibid., 30 [23-24]; cf., 554-555. 
10 Ibid., 17-18 [11-12]; cf. 545. 
11 Ibid., 18 [12]; cf. 546. 
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being is historically constituted.‛12  Foucault’s central methodological thesis, then, is 
that it is by virtue of these conditions that the entire domain of givenness itself—
being—is forged in such a way that the differences between one problematization 
and another can mark out the border delineating specific historical periods.  The 
decisive issue then is whether or not these conditions ought to be viewed, as 
Koopman proposes, as contingently forged antecedent states of affairs or processes 
or as historical eidetic structures as I have claimed. 
 The textual evidence is, I believe, clear.  A pattern of normalization, epistemic 
rules, and a disciplinary model cannot be treated as preexisting states of affairs nor 
as past empirical processes.  Rather, these all denote historically specific, yet still for-
mal templates that govern how objects, statements, practices, and ideas exist and 
interact.  They thus necessarily stand anterior to the empirical processes and rela-
tions to which Koopman appeals.  
 More importantly, I think, if we did treat these conditions as prior historical 
complexes conditioning what follows from them, as Koopman proposes, this would 
force Foucault into an impasse where the question of the causal efficacy of such 
conditions, here in the form of historical causation, would, of necessity, be opened 
but would be impossible to resolve.   
 Taken together, these concerns suggest that the root problem in Koopman’s 
pragmatist approach is that it borders on being exactly the kind of historical 
positivism from which Foucault continually sought to differentiate his own project. 
Throughout his career, Foucault said that his histories, whatever else they may be, 
were not histories of ideas nor of behaviors because they did not take the positivities, 
the empirical givens, of knowledge and practice as their ultimate objects and domain 
of investigation.  They sought instead the historical, yet a priori conditions that make 
thought and practice possible and that, as such, are properly said to govern them 
both.  Accordingly, the ‚conditions in which human beings ‘problematize’ what they 
are, what they do, and the world in which they live‛ are thus best read, I believe, as 
Foucault’s last attempt to articulate the stratum that he had earlier called the 
‚general system of the formation and transformation of statements,‛13 the historical 
a priori, the archive.  
 But not only is this reading more faithful to Foucault’s own usage and 
methodological reflections, it has the added advantage of pointing to a way out of 
the very impasse that the pragmatist interpretation raises, namely how the 
conditions the history of thought seeks are able to be efficacious. 
 Phenomenology’s fundamental methodological commitment is to describe 
the essential structures of matters as they are given.  This entails, for Foucault, 
among other things, refusing to trace these conditions back to an originating source 
when the matters under examination do not themselves warrant such a move.  As 
                                                 
12 Ibid., 12-13 [6-7]; cf. 542. 
13 Foucault, L’Archéologie du savoir, 171 [Foucault, The Archaeology of Knowledge, 130]. 
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we saw above, this is one of the central tenets of realistic phenomenology and 
Foucault supported this approach by showing, in Les Mots et les Choses, but 
elsewhere as well, that to tether the structures of history to constituting subjectivity 
was to fall back under the anthropological slumber of the ‚enslaved sovereign, 
observed spectator,‛14 the place of man, and the ‚great quadrilateral‛15 of the 
positive and the fundamental that had defined the modern episteme. Accordingly, 
to declare that the historical conditions that eidetic inquiry unearths owe their 
efficacy to any kind of source, be it historical or non-historical, would thus be to 
betray the phenomena themselves by submitting them to the very rules of formation 
that this methodology enables us to isolate.   
 We must thus conclude, I believe, that Foucault did not, as Koopman would 
have it, stumble into ‚something resembling historical-transcendental inquiry.‛ 
(HCTC, 15) On the contrary, his method, despite its variations, remained through-
out, at once, transcendental and historical and, as such, remained within the lineage 
of what I proposed to call the ‚phenomenology of the concept.‛  
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14 Michel Foucault, Les Mots et les Choses. Une archéologie des sciences humaines (Paris: Gallimard, 
1966), 323 [Michel Foucault, The Order of Things: An Archaeology of the Human Sciences (New York: 
Pantheon Books, 1971), 312]. 
15 Ibid., 346 [335].  
